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ABSTRACT
Secure Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is becoming in-
creasingly important with the ever-growing number of Internet-
of-Things (IoT) devices in our daily life. To achieve secure D2D
communication, the key agreement between different IoT devices
without any prior knowledge is becoming desirable. Although vari-
ous approaches have been proposed in the literature, they suffer
from a number of limitations, such as low key generation rate and
short pairing distance. In this paper, we present InaudibleKey, an
inaudible acoustic signal based key generation protocol for mobile
devices. Based on acoustic channel reciprocity, InaudibleKey ex-
ploits the acoustic channel frequency response of two legitimate de-
vices as a common secret to generating keys. InaudibleKey employs
several novel technologies to significantly improve its performance.
We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the proposed system
in different real environments. Compared to state-of-the-art works,
InaudibleKey improves key generation rate by 3-145 times, extends
pairing distance by 3.2-44 times, and reduces information reconcili-
ation counts by 2.5-16 times. Security analysis demonstrates that
InaudibleKey is resilient to a number of malicious attacks. We also
implement InaudibleKey on modern smartphones and resource-
limited IoT devices. Results show that it is energy-efficient and can
run on both powerful and resource-limited IoT devices without
incurring excessive resource consumption.
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1.1 Background
With recent advances in mobile computing and embedded tech-
nology, there is an increasing number of IoT devices in our daily
life, such as smartphone, smart watch, and Google assistant. Corre-
spondingly, it is more and more common to pair two devices for
the purpose of data sharing, synchronization, and collaboration.
For example, two persons that meet for the first time in a meeting
want to associate their smartphones temporarily to exchange their
name card. Due to the "open air" nature of wireless communica-
tion, cryptographic key agreement is a fundamental requirement
to secure D2D communication to achieve confidentiality [1, 2].
The secure key distribution between two communication par-
ties can be addressed by public key infrastructure (PKI). Unfor-
tunately, public key-based solutions are not applicable to mobile
devices because PKI only works if the identity of the other party is
known out of band or only trusted parties have identities signed
by pre-established certificate authorities. Another solution is pre-
distributed key which is usually in the form of master key or key
material. However, key pre-distribution schemes lack scalability,
which makes them incapable in a dynamic environment, where
new devices may join and quit frequently. Near field communica-
tion (NFC) is becoming more and more popular in modern mobile
devices, but its communication range is limited to only tens of cen-
timetres (typically <20 cm). Diffie-Hellman protocol (also named
D-H protocol) is a popular key establishment protocol to establish
cryptographic keys over a public channel. However, D-H protocol is
susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and authenticated
D-H protocol requires the presence of certificate authority (CA).
The most common method to pair mobile devices is still asking the
user to scan nearby devices, choose the target device and confirm
manually, which is neither user friendly nor suitable for devices
without screens.
1.2 Motivation
The lack of efficient and user-friendly pairing methods has inspired
researchers to explore suitable alternatives to authenticate mobile
devices. Because two devices are not assumed to own any shared
knowledge as a-priori, the widely adopted design principle in the
literature is that if multiple devices share a similar observation of
certain random signal, then the signal can be used to extract keys.
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Different designs explore different forms of such random signals [3–
11], while they all strive to achieve a fast (sufficient bit generation
rate), practical (without requiring extra hardware) and ubiquitous
(usable in different environments) key generation system design.
A successful set of pioneer efforts is to leverage wireless channel
information [1, 3–6, 12], such as Received Signal Strength Indicator
(RSSI) and Channel State Information (CSI). These methods are
based on wireless channel reciprocity which means the channel
characteristics (RSSI or CSI) measured between two devices by
exchanging a pair of probe packets in quick succession, will be
nearly the same. However, RSSI-based methods suffer from low key
generation rate and predictable channel attack [3, 5]. CSI-based
systems can improve key generation rate greatly and are robust
to predictable channel attack [4]. However, the major limitation
is it requires special toolkits to extract CSI from wireless card,
and currently CSI can only be extracted from a limited number of
chipsets such as Intel’s 5300 NIC [13, 14].
To overcome this issue, many recent designs appear for mobile
platforms by utilizing the on-board sensory data, such as acoustic
data, motion sensor data, bio-sensor data, etc. However, through
our study, we find that they mainly trade the sensor’s availability
for other two further restrictions — either the system works in a
very short pairing distance, e.g., 1.25 cm in Proximate [8], 5cm in
TDS [4], or in a limited set of pre-defined contexts, e.g., in certain
environments, when users are performing certain activities [10, 11],
etc. The designs requiring short pairing distance are not preferable
because people need to keep social distance (usually >1.5m) in their
daily life since the outbreak of COVID-19. Many other approaches
may further suffer a long authentication delay [15], need expen-
sive software to support (e.g., public key) [16], or require extra
hardware (e.g., bio-sensors) [17, 18]. In this paper, we thus aim to
investigate whether we can still achieve a fast and ubiquitous key
agreement system design that can pair two mobile devices beyond
social distance, yet without using extra sensors not available on
mobile devices?
1.3 Our Approach and Design Challenges
We find that the acoustic signals have such a great potential, in-
spired by the success from previous radio signal based designs.
Acoustic wave, as a form of wave, possesses many properties that
radio wave has. In particular, we exploit to leverage acoustic channel
reciprocity to generate keys. One primary advantage of using acous-
tic signal is that it is not dependent on special hardware as most
mobile devices are equipped with microphone and speaker. Our
preliminary study also validates that the acoustic channel indeed
holds channel reciprocity, as well as temporal variation and spatial
decorrelation, which could serve as the basics of key generation.
However, because of the limited acoustic channel bandwidth and
the location offset between speaker and microphone, a number of
challenges need to be addressed to design an efficient and robust
key agreement protocol based on the acoustic signal.
(1) Firstly, how to achieve high bit generation rate through nar-
row band acoustic channels. To this end, we need to extract
fine-grained acoustic channel information. Unfortunately, dif-
ferent from wireless card, microphone is not designed to pro-
vide channel information such as RSSI and CSI. To extract fine-
grained channel information, we design an effective transmit-
ting scheme that uses the inaudible acoustic signal to modulate
Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) symbols.
Although applying OFDM modulation in acoustic signals is
proposed in FingerIO [19], the use of OFDM in a key generation
system can provide more acoustic channel information that can
be used to generate keys. As a result, the key generation rate is
significantly improved as demonstrated in our evaluation.
(2) Secondly, how to further improve the entropy of the extracted
key. Existing quantization methods usually use a threshold to
determine whether a sample should be encoded to ‘1’ or ‘0’ [3].
However, thesemethodsmay produce repeated bit stringswhich
reduce the entropy of the generated keys. Additionally, these
keys are used directly to generate the final key, which leaves
opportunities for powerful attackers to obtain raw information
by reverse engineering. To tackle this problem, we first apply a
novel Bloom filter-based technology to protect the keys against
reverse engineering attack. Then, we leverage Karhunen-Loeve
Transform (KLT) to remove the redundant information and
enhance randomness.
(3) Thirdly, the microphone and speaker are not located at the
same location in mobile devices. Hence, the transmitted signal
and received signal will experience slightly different channels.
Moreover, due to hardware diversity and manufacture imper-
fection [20], different microphones/speakers attenuate some
frequencies selectively which will further cause more errors. To
address this challenge, we optimise a novel compressive sens-
ing (CS) based reconciliation mechanism. The discrepancies
between two initial keys can be corrected with the help of pow-
erful ℓ1 optimization. In particular, InaudibleKey can achieve
high matching rate even for different types of IoT devices.
Although several recent works have exploited acoustic signal to
pair mobile devices [15, 16, 21, 22], our system shows significant
performance improvement. We make the following contributions
in this paper:
• System Design.We propose InaudibleKey, an inaudible acoustic
signal-based key agreement protocol for mobile devices. Based
on acoustic channel reciprocity, InaudibleKey utilizes the channel
frequency response of OFDM symbols to generate keys. Inaudi-
bleKey employs several novel approaches to significantly improve
the system performance. Particularly, we propose an optimisa-
tion algorithm to improve the performance of a state-of-the-art
reconciliation method.
• System Implementation. To demonstrate the feasibility, we im-
plement the prototype of InaudibleKey on both powerful devices
(smartphone) and resource-limited devices (Arduino Uno board).
Evaluation results show that InaudibleKey incurs low system cost
and can run efficiently on these IoT devices. We also demonstrate
that it is more energy efficient than public key cryptography and
authenticated D-H protocol on IoT devices.
• System Evaluation.We conduct extensive experiments in dif-
ferent real environments. Compared to state-of-the-art works,
2
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Figure 1: Feasibility Study.
InaudibleKey improves key generation rate by 3–145 times, ex-
tends pairing distance by 3.2–44 times, reduces information rec-
onciliation counts by 2.5–16 times.
• Security Analysis. Extensive analysis shows that InaudibleKey
is robust to a number of malicious attacks, such as eavesdropping
attack, imitating attack and predictable channel attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present prelimi-
nary study results in Sec. 2, followed by a description of the system
model in Sec. 3. Then we specify the system design in Sec. 4. We
evaluate the performance of InaudibleKey in Sec. 5 and analyze its
security against attacks in Sec. 6. Finally, Sec. 7 discusses related
works, and Sec. 8 concludes the paper.
2 FEASIBILITY STUDY
We first conduct preliminary study to verify whether acoustic chan-
nel hold channel reciprocity, temporal variation and spatial decor-
rrelation which serve as the basis for key generation.
Channel reciprocity. Channel reciprocity means the channel
characteristics (gains, phase shifts, and delays) measured between
two devices by exchanging a pair of probe packets within channel
coherence time will be very close [3]. For wireless channel, the
widely used channel characteristics include RSSI [3, 23] and CSI [1,
4, 6]. Unfortunately, the microphone cannot report such channel
information. Recent studies use channel taps 1 [21] and sound
pressure [22] as acoustic channel characteristics. However, we find
that they can only provide coarse-grained channel measurements.
In this paper, we use channel frequency response (CFR), which
can provide fine-grained acoustic channel information. CFR means
the response of a channel at different frequencies. The multipath
fading affects different frequencies across the channel to different
degrees giving rise to frequency selective channel [24]. Moreover,
if one of the devices is moving such as shaken by the user, it will
also cause channel variations due to Doppler effect. Therefore, the
received signal will have different responses at different frequencies.
In other words, the randomness in acoustic channel responses can
be used to generate keys just like radio channel characteristics.
To validate the channel reciprocity, Alice and Bob exchange a
number of acoustic signals while Eve (20 cm away) is eavesdropping
the acoustic signal between Alice and Bob. Fig. 1(a) plots the CFR
of Alice, Bob and Eve. We can see that the CFR of the legitimate
devices are close to each other while Eve has different channel
1channel taps are the aggregate of delays caused by multi-path effect [24].
responses (though there are some similarities in certain frequencies).
However, we also find the CFRs of Alice and Bob are not exactly
the same. First, the signals transmitted by Alice and Bob are not
transmitted exactly along the same path because the speaker and
microphone are located in different locations on the smartphone.
This is different from the wireless devices transmission, where the
transceivers could always use one specific antenna. Second, the
hardware frequency selectivity from imperfect hardware such as
speaker [20], can also result in the CFR difference. Therefore, we
can see different strengthened and weakened power amplitudes at
each frequency.
Temporal variation. We set up two mobile phones—namely,
Alice and Bob— in a laboratory with a distance of 1 m. Alice keeps
sending inaudible acoustic signals whose frequency varies from
18 kHz to 22 kHz, while Bob is listening to the acoustic channel.
Fig. 1(b) shows the channel frequency response at two different
times (t1 and t2 in Fig. 1(b)) when the user shakes one of the devices.
We can see the acoustic channel response at different time instances
are different.When the user is shaking device randomly the acoustic
channel between Alice and Bob changes rapidly. If the environment
changes such as a person walks by, the acoustic channel will also
change due to multi-path and Doppler effect just like the radio
channel.
Spatial decorrelation. To validate spatial decorrelation, we
vary the distance between Eve and Bob from 1 cm to 100 cm. As
shown in Fig. 1(c), the correlation between Eve’s and Bob’s chan-
nel responses decreases rapidly as the distance increases. Accord-
ing to radio propagation theory [24], the channel will be statisti-
cally uncorrelated if two devices are separated by half wavelength
away. If we use 22 kHz frequency audio signal, the wavelength _ is
1.7 cm. Therefore, if Eve is located away from a legitimate device by
_ = 0.85 cm, it will have different channel measurements. In prac-
tice, however, this distance is set as at least multiple wavelengths
to alleviate a poor multipath scattering environment or interfer-
ence and enhance security [25]. From Fig. 1(c), we can see that the
correlation drops below 0.4 when the distance between Eve and
legitimate device is greater than 10 cm. Hence, the secure distance
is 10 cm in this paper, and we assume any attacker entering this
range can be easily spotted by Alice or Bob.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 2 illustrates the systemmodel in this paper. We assume that two
mobile devices, namely Alice and Bob, intend to generate the same
3
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Figure 2: System model
key to secure their communication. Both devices are equipped with
a speaker and a microphone. They have no prior shared secrets
except that they have InaudibleKey installed. We assume that an
adversary device Eve is located beyond a safe distance (10 cm in
InaudibleKey) to the legitimate devices. If Eve moves within the
safe distance, it can be easily spotted by the users as noted in [16].
One application scenario can be illustrated as follows. Suppose in a
meeting, Alice and Bobwhomeet for the first timewant to exchange
their name card safely. But to keep social distance, they cannot
establish a secure communication channel via existing approaches,
such as Touch-and-Guard [18], shake-n-shack [11] or NFC. By using
InaudibleKey, they can simply shake their device (e.g., smart watch)
or perform a random gesture near the device for a short while. A
secure communication is then established between them even they
are 1-2 m away from each other. If there are sufficient randomness
such as moving subjects/objects around users, they do not even
need to take any actions (see our demo 2).
We assume that Eve has the full knowledge of the key agreement
protocol and can eavesdrop, inject, and replay messages. However,
like many previous key generation studies [1, 4, 10, 16, 21], al-
though Eve can inject messages to the public wireless channel, we
assume the goal of Eve is to intercept the secret key rather than
jamming their communications (i.e., DOS attack). In fact, the DOS
attack against InaudibleKey can be performed by jamming inaudi-
ble acoustic signals into the environment. We can use the methods
in the literature [26] to detect such attack. So we consider three
types of attacks that are commonly used in related work [1, 21].
• Eavesdropping attack: Eve eavesdrops all the messages trans-
mitted in the public channel to extract the same key.
• Imitating attack: After Alice or Bob finish key extraction, Eve
approaches the same site with the aim of generating the same
key as a legitimate user. For example, Eve can first observe
how Alice or Bob uses devices, e.g. the way of moving or
shaking smartphones, then try to imitate his/her use pattern
and generate the same key.
• Predictable channel attack: Eve can deliberatelymove around
to generate desired or predictable changes in the channel
between Alice and Bob.
4 SYSTEM DESIGN
Fig. 3 shows the work-flow of InaudibleKey. Suppose Alice and
Bob are two devices that want to generate a secret key. Firstly,
they exchange a number of inaudible acoustic frames and calculate
the CFR. Then both devices follow the steps in Fig. 3 to generate
2https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lQIMuJahDV5PFhucXj3VODuFyXunn2Y5/view
Figure 3: System Flowchart.
the same cryptographic key. Finally, they use the extracted key to
secure their communication.
4.1 Transmitting signal design
In sampling phase, both Alice and Bob exchange a number of acous-
tic frames by transmitting via speaker and receiving via microphone
to obtain channel measurements. InaudibleKey uses inaudible fre-
quency band from 18 kHz to 22 kHz for not disturbing users.
To obtain fine-grained channel information, we apply OFDM
technology on an acoustic signal based on the method in Finge-
rIO [19]. Specifically, we divide the 18-22 kHz frequency band into
64 subcarriers so that the width of each subcarrier is 62.5Hz. The
transmitting time-domain samples can be obtained by performing
inverse Fast Fourier transform (IFFT) on the transmitted data, and
the receiver can reconstruct the raw data bits by a Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT). A speaker will transmit the vectors with 64 real
values from the OFDM symbol construction. Another advantage
of using OFDM technology is that both devices can probe channel
within channel coherence time without explicitly synchronising
two mobile devices. In fact, it is impractical to assume two mobile
devices are synchronised when they first meet each other. We use
the first 𝑆𝑠𝑢𝑓 of these values to form a cyclic suffix that is appended
to the end of OFDM symbol. The cyclic suffix is used to accurately
estimate the beginning of the OFDM symbol. Even Alice and Bob
are not synchronized, they can still locate the beginning of the re-
ceived symbol by calculating the correlation between the received
signal and known transmitting signal (see [19] for more details).
The length of the transmitting signal and the transmitting inter-
val is important for the following two reasons. 1) We need to make
sure Alice and Bob obtain the channel estimation within coherence
time, so their CFRs are highly correlated; 2) the transmitting in-
terval should be larger than the coherence time. Otherwise, the
consecutive CFRs will be correlated and the randomness of the key
will be reduced. In theory, the rate at which the channel varies
is represented by Doppler frequency (𝑓𝑑 ) and the duration when
the channel is stable which is denoted by channel coherence time
(𝑇𝑐 ). Coherence time is the time domain dual of Doppler spread
and is used to characterize the time varying nature of the channel
frequency. Suppose the moving speed of the subject or object is 𝑣 ,
the channel frequency is 𝑓 , and the speed of acoustic signal is 𝑐
(340𝑚/𝑠), then the maximum Doppler frequency is 𝑓𝑑 =
𝑣 · 𝑓
𝑐 [27].
Practically, the channel coherence time with respect to the maxi-






The acoustic signal used in InaudibleKey is from 18 kHz to
22 kHz, and the speed of common human motions varies from
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(a) Impact of window size





















(b) An example of quantization (c) Projecting the Bits into Bloom filter space
Figure 4: Illustration of quantization process.
0.1–2.7 m/s [28]. Therefore, the coherence time lies in the range
of 2 ms to 53 ms. In InaudibleKey, we set the length of the cyclic
suffix 𝑆𝑠𝑢𝑓 to 26. Therefore, the transmitted symbol contains 90
samples. Given 48 kHz sampling rate, the transmitter takes 1.9 ms
to transmit these 90 samples, which is shorter than the minimum
coherence time. In terms of transmitting interval, Alice and Bob
exchange acoustic signals every 100 ms, which is longer than the
maximum coherence time.
4.2 Quantization
4.2.1 Multiple-bit quantizer. Upon receiving the signal from Bob,
Alice applies a Butterworth band-pass filter (18–22 kHz) to filter out
the environmental noises and calculate the CFR using the method
in [16]. When calculating CFR, the window length plays an impor-
tant role: if it is too small, there is not much entropy; however, if it is
too large, there will be more mismatches (Fig. 4(a)). We empirically
use a Hamming window whose size is 2000 in InaudibleKey.
Then the CFR is quantized to binary bits (0s and 1s) by multiple-
bit quantization technique proposed in [3]. To be specific, we first
divide the CFR measurements into several windows with no over-
lap (window size𝑊 = 20). Then for each window, we divide the
samples into multiple quantization levels. Each level in the quanti-
zation is assigned an n–bit code. For example, if 𝑛 = 2, then each
sample will be converted into 2 bits. We also insert guard band
between different levels to mitigate the effect of mismatches. We
use 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1] to represent the ratio of guard band to data. The
larger the 𝛼 is, the more mismatches are discarded. However, it is
possible that the length of the keys generated by Alice and Bob are
different. To solve this issue, we exchange the indices of samples
that are used to generate keys and only reserve keys generated at
the common indices. Fig. 4(b) shows how to convert a window of 20
samples into bits. After quantization, we assume the keys generated





4.2.2 Anti Reverse Engineering. Most previous work on key gen-
eration utilize the quantized bits directly to get the final secret
key. However, Eve can perform attacks to derive the key from data
collected by herself and the data transferred between Alice and Bob.
The Bloom filter has been used as part of the encoding and pertur-
bation methods in many privacy-preserving applications [29, 30].
Unfortunately, traditional Bloom filter projections cannot remain
the order information (without additional process). In other words,
the mismatches between the two input key strings and output key
strings may be different. In InaudibleKey, we use a special designed
Bloom filter data structure considering sequence/order informa-
tion, which can help project the key into Bloom filter. The purpose
of utilizing the adapted Bloom filter is to keep the key distance
information while in a non-plaintext format.
The detailed process is presented by the Fig. 4(c). Take a 64-bit
key as an example, each single bit position information is con-
veyed by an addition bit(s) before Bloom filter hash-mapping. Af-
terwards, two hash functions are used to hash-map each element
in the adding-position-bits to the Bloom filtered space. The Bloom
filter hash-mapping will only turn the ‘0’ into ‘1’ based on the hash
value (calculation) (see [31] for the original rationale). As a result,
each ‘1’ in Bloom filter refers to a bit (‘0’ or ‘1’) at a certain position
of the original key ‘uniquely’. Most importantly, this adapted Bloom
filter data structure can also hold the Jaccard distance between the
raw data bits and the projected Bloom filter data bits. That is to













, then there will be also 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑠 mismatches between 𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 and
𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 . The proof of this can be referred from [30]. Thus, we can
directly use the following information reconciliation approach on





. Note that although the Boom filter is
an irreversible one-way function, if the input key’s length is too
short, Eve can still get the Bloom filter’s output, such as through
brute-force attack. Therefore, we need to ensure the entropy of
the input of the Bloom filter. In InaudibleKey, we concatenate the
bits generated from each window to a key string and further di-
vide it into consecutive segments where each segment contains 128
bits. Since Eve has no knowledge of the number and location of
the incorrect bits, it is computationally infeasible (2128 guesses)




. The adapted Bloom filter, which only
use hash functions and limit temporary storage (to store the Bloom
filter results), will not involve much overhead to our entire mobile
system.
4.3 Information Reconciliation
Because of noise, we usually get 𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 ≈ 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 instead of exactly
identical keys. The purpose of reconciliation is to correct the mis-
matches between 𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 and 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 . In InaudibleKey, we optimise a
recent developed CS-based reconciliation method [32] to improve
the key agreement rate. To make this paper more self-contained,
we first succinctly describe the flow of this method then present
our optimisation algorithm.
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The key idea of the reconciliation method [32] is the mismatches
between Alice and Bob is much less than that of Alice and Eve (i.e.,
more sparse). Suppose the keys after bloom filter are 𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∈ 𝑅𝑁
and 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 ∈ 𝑅𝑁 , respectively. The sampling matrix is 𝐴 ∈ 𝑅𝑀 ·𝑁
which obeys the restricted isometry property (RIP) [33]. Researches
have found a random Bernoulli matrix with equally distributed
works well, so we use a random Bernoulli matrix in InaudibleKey.
Then Alice and Bob follow the steps below to correct their mis-
matches.
(1) Firstly, Bob generates a compressed vector 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 = 𝐴 ·𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 ∈
𝑅𝑀 and transmits it to Alice via public channel.
(2) Secondly, after receiving 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 , Alice calculates the difference
between 𝑦𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 and 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 :
𝑦𝐴,𝐵 = 𝑦𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 = 𝐴(𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 ) + 𝑒 = 𝐴Δ𝑥 + 𝑒 (1)
where 𝑦𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝐴𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 and Δ𝑥 represents the mismatches
between 𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 and 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 and 𝑒 ∈ 𝑅𝑀 is noise.
(3) Finally, Alice apply ℓ1 optimization to reconstruct Δ𝑥 from the
compressed data 𝑦𝐴,𝐵 [33]:
argmin
Δ𝑥
∥Δ𝑥 ∥1 subject to ∥𝑦𝐴,𝐵 −𝐴Δ𝑥 ∥2 < 𝜖. (2)
where 𝜖 is used to account for noise. Then, Alice can deduce
𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 by 𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 ⊕ Δ𝑥 , and both Alice and Bob agree
on the same key 𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 .
When we use the above method, we find that the performance
varies a lot. We find out it is because the sampling matrix 𝐴 is
generated randomly. To address this problem, we propose an op-
timisation problem to improve its performance. According to the
theory of compressive sensing [34], the random matrix 𝐴 must
meet the following two conditions.
𝑀 (𝐴) ≤ 𝐶
log𝑁
, 𝑠 ≤ 𝐶𝑁
log𝑁 · ∥𝐴∥22
(3)
where𝐶 is a constant, 𝑁 is the length of the key (e.g., the number of
columns of𝐴), 𝑠 is the sparsity of the key, and𝑀 (𝐴) means the mu-




∥𝑎𝑖 ∥ ∥𝑎 𝑗 ∥
where 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑎 𝑗 represent the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ and 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ columns of 𝐴
respectively. In fact, 𝑀 (𝐴) represents the maximum value of cross-
correlation between columns in𝐴. If𝐴 is generated randomly every
time, it is hard to ensure it always has good mutual coherence. That
is why the performance varies greatly for different 𝐴. If we change




see that if ∥𝐴∥22 is smaller, it is easier for 𝐴 to meet the second con-
dition. Therefore, the goal of our proposed optimisation algorithm
is to minimise𝑀 (𝐴) iteratively.
As shown in Algorithm 1, we start with finding two columns that
have minimum coherence from a searching space Ω. Ω includes
a large finite set of random matrices. Then in each iteration, we
choose a vector from Ω that can minimise the maximum mutual
coherence between this vector and those already in𝐴. Finally, when
we find 𝑁 such columns, the iteration terminates and we output
the optimised matrix 𝐴 which has the minimum mutual coherence.
This optimisation is conducted offline, so it does not incur any
computation overhead. Note that although several other works
also optimise projection matrix by minimising mutual coherence or
row coherence [35, 36], the problems to be solved are different, i.e.,
they aim to optimise a projection matrix for a certain dictionary to
obtain better recovery signal.
Algorithm 1 Sampling Matrix Optimisation
Objective: Find a matrix A with minimal𝑀 (𝐴)
Input: Search space Ω, the number of columns of 𝐴 is 𝑁 .
Initialisation: traverse Ω to find two column vectors 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 such
that their coherence is minimal, 𝐴 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2 }, Ω = Ω\{𝑎1, 𝑎2 }, 𝑖 = 2
while 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 do




Ω = Ω\{𝑎 𝑗 }
𝑖++
end while
Output: optimised matrix 𝐴 = [𝑎1, 𝑎2, · · · , 𝑎𝑚 ]
The optimised reconciliation method presents several advan-
tages. Firstly, Bob only transmits the compressed key instead of
the original key. Even if Eve eavesdrops this message, she cannot
reconstruct Bob’s key 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 as will be discussed in Sec. 6. So it en-
sures security. Secondly, unlike some conventional reconciliation
methods, this approach does not discard errors during reconcilia-
tion process. With the powerful ℓ1 optimization, this approach can
recover more errors than previous reconciliation methods as will
be demonstrated in Sec. 5.7. Thus, it can improve key generation
rate. Finally, some methods require both Alice and Bob to perform
reconciliation to correct the errors between their keys. However,
in the CS-based approach, only one device needs to perform recon-
ciliation (e.g., Alice in this example). The users can choose to run
ℓ1 optimization on the power-rich devices to mitigate the computa-
tional burden on resource-limited IoT devices. Thus, this approach
can improve energy efficiency as will be demonstrated in Sec 5.10.
As discussed in Sec 3, Eve has the power to modify, insert and
replay messages. So she can perform two common attacks during
reconciliation process: MITM and replay attack. Eve can launch
MITM by impersonating as Alice or Bob during key generation
process to modify or insert her own messages. To solve this prob-
lem, we apply the message authentication code (MAC) method
to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the message [5]. Bob
includes an additional MAC message with 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 , so the total mes-
sage sent to Alice becomes 𝐿𝐵𝑜𝑏 = {𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 , 𝑀𝐴𝐶 (𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 , 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 )}. Af-
ter receiving 𝐿𝐵𝑜𝑏 , Alice computes 𝐾
′
𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒
by Eq. 2 and verifies its
identity. If 𝑀𝐴𝐶 (𝐾 ′′
𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒
, 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 ) ≠ 𝑀𝐴𝐶 (𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 , 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 ), Alice knows
that the message was modified, indicating the presence of Eve. If
𝑀𝐴𝐶 (𝐾 ′′
𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒
, 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 ) = 𝑀𝐴𝐶 (𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 , 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 ), Alice can confirm that
this message was indeed originated from Bob. To detect replay at-
tacks, we can adopt some commonly used methods such as nounces,
timestamps or tagging each message with a session ID [37].
Although the above methods can prevent MITM and replay at-
tacks, Eve can utilise the eavesdropped 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 to infer the shared key
𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 . The authors in [32] pointed out two potential vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability 1: Eve can try to recover Bob’s key from 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 by
ℓ1 optimisation directly.
Vulnerability 2: Eve may launch the three types of attacks
mentioned in Sec. 3 to obtain her own channel measurement. Then
she can impersonate as a legitimate device and perform the same
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reconciliation process as Alice by using her channel measurement
with the aim of generating the same key.
The authors in [32] have proved that the CS-based reconciliation
approach is perfectly effective and secure if the number of rows of
𝐴 𝑀 meets the following condition:
𝑃 < 𝑀 < 𝑄, 𝑃 = 𝑆Δ𝐴,𝐵 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁 /𝑆Δ𝐴,𝐵), 𝑄 =𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆𝐵𝑜𝑏 , 𝑆Δ𝐵,𝐸 )
where 𝑆Δ𝐴,𝐵 is the sparsity of Δ𝑥 , 𝑆𝐵𝑜𝑏 is the sparsity of 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 ,
𝑆Δ𝐵,𝐸 is the sparsity of difference between 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 and 𝐾𝐸𝑣𝑒 , respec-
tively. The sparsity here means the number of non-zero values in
the corresponding vector, i.e., the number of mismatches. As noted
in [32], the design for an effective and secure CS-based reconcilia-
tion is a problem to find a suitable𝑀 , with upper bound 𝑄 being
the secure threshold, and the lower bound 𝑃 being the effective
threshold. We conduct extensive experiments to find a proper range
of𝑀 in Sec. 6.
4.4 Privacy Amplification
Although multi-level quantization can generate more bits from one
sample, it may also generate some duplicated bits as the example in
Fig. 4(b). Directly using such a key will weaken the security of the
system. Note that the Bloom filter-based approach in Sec 4.2.2 can
prevent reverse engineering attack but cannot improve entropy. To
address this problem, we use Karhunen-Loeve Transform (KLT) to
decorrelate the bit sequence after reconciliation.
Assume the generated key byAlice after reconciliation is𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
(𝑘1, 𝑘2, · · · , 𝑘𝐿)𝑇 , where 𝑘𝑖 is the 𝑖-th bit and 𝐿 is the length of the
key. The first step in KLT is to calculate the auto-correlation matrix
𝑅 = 𝐸 (𝐾𝐾𝑇 ). Next, we calculate its eigen value _𝑖 and eigen vector
𝜙𝑖 so that 𝑅𝜙 = _𝑖𝜙𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, · · · , 𝐿). Note that 𝑅 is Hermitian,
and its eigenvectors 𝜙𝑖 are orthogonal. If we rank eigen values in a
descending order, _1 > _2 > · · · > _𝐿 , we can construct an unitary
matrix Φ which diagonalizes 𝑅: Φ = [𝜙1, · · · , 𝜙𝐿]. Φ is called the
KLT matrix and can be used to decorrelate the bit sequences 𝐾 . We
choose the largest 𝑆 eigenvectors to construct Φ, so we can obtain
a decorrelated key string by 𝐾 ′′
𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒
= Φ𝑇𝐾𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 . In the same way,






Although reconciliation can improve the reliability of a key gen-
eration protocol, it reveals partial information to Eve. Privacy ampli-
fication is a common approach to remove the revealed information
from the generated secret key sequence. It is usually implemented
by the extractor, universal hashing functions, and cryptographic
hash functions [38]. In InaudibleKey, we use the commonly used
dual universal hash function [39] to generate the final key. Finally,
the key can be used by encryption algorithms such as AES-128 to
secure their communication.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Goals, Metrics and Methodology
Experimental Setup.We implement InaudibleKey on Samsung
S10 which is equipped with microphone and speaker. The frequency
range of the inaudible acoustic signal is 18-22 kHz, and the sampling
rate is 48 kHz. The volume of the speaker is set to the maximum, and
the corresponding sound pressure level (SPL) of the acoustic signal
is 82 dB. Bluetooth Low Energy broadcast is used as the public
channel to exchange reconciliation information. These settings can
be supported bymost modern mobile devices. We conduct extensive
experiments with four smartphones, namely, Alice, Bob, Eve, and
David (Eve’s partner). Same as the state-of-the-art [4, 21], data are
collected in four different scenarios: A—indoor static, B—outdoor
static, C—indoor mobile, D—outdoor mobile. In mobile scenarios,
the users can shake Alice and Bob, or carry them and walk around.
In static scenarios, Alice and Bob are stationary while some people
are moving around. The indoor experiments are conducted in a
student laboratory while the outdoor experiments are carried out on
a campus road. In each environment, we vary the distance between
Alice and Bob from 10 cm to 300 cm to evaluate the impact of
distance. Eve and David are located at least 10 cm away from the
legitimate devices.
5.2 Parameter Selection
We first evaluate the impact of important parameters in Inaudi-
bleKeywhich include the guard band ratio𝛼 in quantization (Sec. 4.2.1)
and the number of eigenvectors 𝑆 in privacy amplification (Sec. 4.4).
The guard band ratio 𝛼 trades off the key generation rate and
key agreement rate, Generally, a larger 𝛼 means more samples are
discarded which improves bit matching rate but decreases the bit
generation rate. Fig. 5 shows the impact of 𝛼 on key generation
rate and key matching rate. First, we can see the matching rate
increases significantly after information reconciliation. Also, we
can see that the key agreement rate rises with the increase of 𝛼 as
more mismatch bits are discarded. In InaudibleKey, we use 𝛼 = 0.9
because it achieves a high key agreement rate while generating
sufficient bits. Although a larger 𝛼 decreases key generation rate,
from Fig. 5(b) we can see that it can still achieve a generation rate of
768 bit/sec with 𝛼 = 0.9. The key generation rate of InaudibleKey
significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art works: it is 3× faster
than FREE [21], 7× faster than TDS [4], 30× faster than Walkie-
Talkie [10], 256 × faster than H2B [32], respectively. Therefore,
in terms of key generation rate, InaudibleKey is a better option
than using radio signal (e.g., TDS [4]), motion sensor signal (e.g.,
Walkie-Talkie [10], Shake-n-Shack [11]), and biometrics signal (e.g.,
H2H [40], H2B [32]).
The number of selected eigen vectors 𝑆 trades off the key gen-
eration rate and entropy. If 𝑆 is larger, InaudibleKey can generate
more keys but with lower entropy. If 𝑆 is smaller, InaudibleKey can
generate fewer keys with higher entropy. Fig. 5(c) shows the impact
of 𝑆 on key generation rate and entropy. We can see that if 𝑆 is
less than 80, the improvement of entropy levels off. Therefore, we
choose the largest 80 eigenvectors to form the decorrelation matrix.
5.3 Impact of Distance
After determining 𝛼 , we evaluate the impact of distance between
Alice and Bob on system performance. Fig. 5(d) shows that the
key agreement rate decreases slightly when the distance between
Alice and Bob increases from 10 cm to 220 cm. Then, it starts to
drop quickly when the distance further increases from 220 cm to
300 cm. This is becausewhen the distance increases, the audio signal
attenuates exponentially due to path loss [41]. From Fig. 5(e), we
find that the key generation rate first increases when the distance
increases from 10 cm to 20 cm, then becomes stable from 20 cm to
230 cm after which they start to drop rapidly. This is because Line-of-
Sight channel dominates the signal when two devices are very close
7
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Figure 5: Impact of 𝛼 , 𝑆 and distance.
and hence there is not much randomness to use. However, when the
communication distance is too large, more environmental noise is
involved in the received signal and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
becomes low, which leads to more discrepancies. From Fig. 5(d)
and Fig. 5(e), we find that [20 cm, 220 cm] is a reasonable pairing
range to achieve both high agreement rate and bit generation rate.
InaudibleKey extends the pairing distance by 3.2 times compared
to FREE [21], and 44 times compared to TDS [4].
Researchers have revealed that people’s social distance varies
from 1.2 m to 3.7 m [42]. Therefore, InaudibleKey can meet the
pairing requirement of mobile devices in most cases. If the distance
of two users is larger than pairing range (say >3m), user can ei-
ther walk a few steps closer to the target or use a shorter key for
temporary association, depending on the application requirement
and user’s preference. In particular, nowadays people should keep
1.5–2 m social distance due to pandemic. Our system can help users
establish a secure communication channel without close contact,
and thus help stop the spread of COVID-19.
5.4 Impact of Different Environments
In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of different environ-
ments by using the data in the range of [20 cm, 220 cm]. Fig. 6(a)
illustrates the key generation rate and key agreement rate in dif-
ferent scenarios. Intuitively, the key agreement rate of outdoor
environment (i.e, B and D) is slightly lower than that of indoor en-
vironment (i.e., A and C). This is because there are less multi-path
effect and more environmental noise in outdoor environment [6].
In terms of generation rate, we can see that the mobile scenarios
(i.e., C and D) can generate more bits in comparison with static
scenarios (i.e., A and B). This is because the mobile scenarios can
generate more channel diversity and randomness.
5.5 Impact of Background Noise
While our analysis above show that InaudibleKey consistently
achieve high agreement rate, the experiments are conducted on
campus only. The real-world environment is more complex and
may contain various kinds of noise. We now study the degradation
in matching rate with increasing background noise. We manually
add 18-22 kHz random Gaussian noise with different intensities (30,
50 and 70 dB). From Fig. 6(b), we can see that the key agreement rate
only drops slightly when the noise level is 30 dB. However, when
we further increase the noise level, the key agreement rate drops
significantly. Actually, in the range of 18-22 kHz, there are little
environment noise in the normal office and street environments,
and such noise usually happens in factory and metro station [20].
To verify this, we conducted another experiment in four common
environments: coffee shop, shopping centre, bus station and metro
station. The distance between Alice and Bob is about 1 m, and we
collect 30 minutes data for each environment. All measurements
are made between 9 AM and 6 PM. In this experiment, we use
success rate (the probability of generating the same key) instead of
matching rate as metric because we want to know how many trials
the users need to successfully pair two devices in real environments.
Fig. 6(c) shows the success rate of each environment. We can see
that InaudibleKey can achieve over 95% success rate in coffee shop
and shopping centre. The success rate in bus station drops slightly,
but it still can achieve over 90% success rate. We notice that the
success rate in metro station drops remarkably. This is because the
noise level of subway stations can be up to over 100 dB according
to prior studies [43, 44]. More importantly, it has more noise in
the inaudible frequency range. However, if we use 8-bit key, the
success rate is still above 92%. The results suggest that in noisy
environment, users can use a short key to improve success rate.
5.6 Impact of Device Diversity
So far, we assume both Alice and Bob use the same model of smart-
phones (i.e., Samsung S10). Now we evaluate the performance of
InaudibleKey when Alice and Bob are different types of devices.
Fig. 7 plots the CFRs of different types of mobile devices, we can
see that when Alice and Bob are using Samsung S10, their CFRs
are very close to each other. While when Bob is using HTC smart-
phone and HUAWEI watch, it involves more differences, but the
CFR pattern over the frequency band is still very similar. Tab. 1
shows the key agreement rate using different devices. It is intuitive
that InaudibleKey achieves the highest success rate when Alice and
Bob are the same type of devices. The success rate drops slightly
when Alice and Bob are different types of devices. This is because
different types of microphone and speaker produce different impact
in the transmitted and recorded acoustic signals. In particularly,
the matching rate of Arduino with other devices are the lowest
because we use a low-price microphone and speaker module as will
be discussed in Sec. 5.10.
5.7 Comparison of Reconciliation Methods
To demonstrate the advantage of our optimisation algorithm, we
compare it with the original CS-based reconciliation method and
other methods. In the literature, two commonly used reconciliation
techniques are error-correcting code (ECC) [23, 45] and interactive
method [5, 10, 46, 47]. In this paper, we use Reed-Solomon code
RS(15,7) and the method in [46] as benchmark. We calculate the key
8
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(b) Impact of background noise




























(c) Performance in real environments
Figure 6: Impact of environment and noise.
















































Figure 8: Different reconciliation methods.
Samsung HTC Huawei Arduino
Samsung 99.2% 94.5% 94.1% 89.3%
HTC 94.5% 98.7% 92.4% 87.7%
Huawei 94.1% 92.4% 98.8% 86.4%
Arduino 89.3% 87.7% 86.4% 95.6%
Table 1: Success rate of different pairs.
agreement rate of each method and plot their results in Fig. 8. The
result of original CS-based method is obtained by averaging the
results of randomly generating sampling matrix 30 times. As can be
seen from Fig. 8, InaudibleKey outperforms the original CS-based
method, interactive method and ECC and consistently achieves the
highest agreement rate in all the environments.
5.8 Comparison with state-of-the-arts
In this subsection, we compare InaudibleKey with several repre-
sentative key agreement approaches for mobile networks. These
methods include KEEP [1], ASBG [3], TDS [4], Radio-telepathy [5],
CGC [6] and FREE [21]. To achieve a fair comparison, we fine-tune
the parameters of other methods to make sure they achieve the
best performance. Specifically, for FREE, the distance between Alice
and Bob is set to 80cm, and the block size is 30. For ASBG, KEEP
and CGC, 𝛼 and fragment size are set as 0.35 and 50, respectively.
For TDS, the block size 𝛽 is 5. The distance between Alice and Bob
is set to 4 cm as suggested by their authors. We compare the key
agreement rate, key generation rate, entropy, and reconciliation
counts of different methods.
Fig. 9 shows the performances of different approaches. From
Fig. 9(a), we can see that the key agreement rate of InaudibleKey
is higher than other approaches except for TDS. In this experi-
ment, TDS can achieve the highest agreement rate because of the
short distance (4 cm). However, such short distance is unrealistic
in practice. From Fig. 9(b), we can see that the key generation rate
of InaudibleKey is significantly higher than previous works. To be
specific, the key generation rate of InaudibleKey is 3× faster than
FREE [21], 7× faster than TDS [4] on average. There are a number
of reasons for the improvement. First, the sampling rate of the audio
signal (i.e., 48kHz) is significantly higher than the radio channel
probing. Second, the channel frequency response can provide more
channel information compared to channel tap used in FREE [21].
Finally, the optimised CS-based reconciliation methods can recover
more mismatches as demonstrated in the last subsection.
Fig. 9(c) shows the entropy of extracted keys. We find that by
using KLT to decorrelate the bit sequences, InaudibleKey achieves
higher entropy than other methods. Fig. 9(d) plots the information
reconciliation counts of different methods. We can see that Inaudi-
bleKey requires the minimum information reconciliation counts.
To successfully generate the same key, InaudibleKey only requires
Alice and Bob to exchange reconciliationmessages 1.6 times on aver-
age. In comparison, TDS requires 4 pass checks [4], and FREE needs
to exchange 25 reconciliation informationmessages on average [21].
In other words, InaudibleKey reduces information reconciliation
counts by 2.5-16 times.
The results show that InaudibleKey improves the key generation
rate, the entropy, and reduces reconciliation counts significantly
compared to the state-of-the-arts.
5.9 Randomness of Key
To evaluate the randomness of the extracted keys, we apply the
commonly used NIST suite of statistical tests [48]. The result of
NIST statistical test are p-values of different test processes which
indicate whether the key is random or not. If p-value is greater
than 1%, then the key is considered to be random. From the results
in Tab. 2, we find that the p-values are all larger than 1%, which
suggests the extracted keys have good quality in randomness.
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Figure 9: Comparison with state-of-the-arts.
Table 3: System overhead.
Samsung S10 Arduino
InaudibleKey RSA ECDHE-RSA InaudibleKey RSA ECDHE-RSA
Processing
Time (ms) 124 361 347 891 4,196 5,481
Energy
Consumption (mJ) 108 391 354 1,107 1,706 2,196
Figure 10: Experimental setup of energy consumption.
5.10 System Implementation
To validate the feasibility of InaudibleKey on various IoT devices,
we implement the prototype of InaudibleKey on Samsung S10 smart-
phone and Arduino Uno board.
The CPU of Samsung S10 is an Snapdragon at 2.84 GHz and the
operating system is Android 9.0. It is equipped with a stereo speaker
and two dedicated microphone with active noise cancellation func-
tion. Only the bottom microphone is used because it is close to the
speaker. The system is implemented in Java and the MAC algorithm
described in Section 4.3 is implemented based on SHA256 (HMAC-
SHA256). In InaudibleKey, we save the transmitted OFDM signal as
a Waveform Audio (WAV) file with a format of 16-bit Pulse Coded
Modulation (PCM), which will be played by speaker. To reduce the
expected response time, we implement InaudibleKey in multiple
threads. Two threads are created after InaudibleKey is launched.
One of the threads is responsible for transmitting WAV file. After
transmitting, the smartphone will transit into listening mode and
another thread which records audio signal from another phone will
be created. In reconciliation, InaudibleKey uses ℓ1-Homotopy [49]
which is an efficient implementation of ℓ1 optimization algorithm.
The complexity of ℓ1-Homotopy is 𝑂 (𝑘3 + 𝑘𝑚𝑛), where 𝑘 is the
sparsity of the solution,𝑚 and 𝑛 are the size of sampling matrix 𝐴
which is 23 and 128, respectively.
Firstly, we compare InaudibleKey with public key cryptography
and Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. For public key cryp-
tography, we use the commonly used RSA as benchmark. Alice
can use RSA to encrypt a 128 bits key which can be decrypted by
Bob. Then, Alice and Bob can use AES-128 to secure their commu-
nication. In this experiment, we use 2048 bits key for RSA which
is recommended by NIST [50]. Traditional Diffie-Hellman proto-
col is susceptible to MITM attack, and is rarely used in practice.
Therefore, we use the commonly used Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
Ephemeral with RSA signature (ECDHE_RSA), which is used in
Transport Layer Security (TLS). We implement these algorithms on
Samsung S10 and calculate their processing time and energy con-
sumption. The implementation of these cryptographic algorithms
are based on the Chilkat library 3. The computation time is obtained
from the console of the development environment (Android studio)
and averaged by the results from 30 tests. The energy consumption
of smartphone is calculated by reading the voltage and current
level of the battery which can be obtained by Android API 4. As
the results in Table 3, we can see that RSA requires 361 ms to finish
a round of encryption and decryption with a 2048 bits key. It takes
about 347 ms for ECDHE_RSA to generate a 128 bits key. However,
InaudibleKey only requires 124 ms to generate a 128 bits key. There-
fore, InaudibleKey is superior to public key cryptography and D-H
protocol in key distribution on mobile devices.
Secondly, to verify the feasibility of InaudibleKey on resource-
limited IoT devices, we implement our system on Arduino Uno
board. Compared to the powerful CPU in Samsung S10, the mi-
crocontroller of Arduino is ATmega328 which only has 32 K flash
memory and 2 K SRAM. There is no default speaker and micro-
phone on Arduino board, so we connect additional speaker module
and microphone module to it. To measure the energy consumption
on Arduino, we connect the output of a 9V battery 5 to digital
oscilloscope. The details of the experimental setup is shown in
Fig. 10. The voltage over the resistor is stored in USB and used
3http://www.chilkatsoft.com/
4https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/BatteryManager.html
5The operating voltage of Atmega328p is 5V, but the input voltage of the Arduino
board is 6V to 12V.
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(c) Feasible range of parameter M
Figure 11: Security analysis.
to calculate the energy consumption of the board. The process-
ing time and energy consumption is shown in Table 3. We can
see that although the system overhead of InaudibleKey is much
higher than that on smartphone, it is still much more efficient than
RSA and ECDHE-RSA. Moreover, the computation-intensive part of
InaudibleKey—reconciliation— can be performed on the power-rich
device (if one of the devices is powerful).
We now analyse the impact of energy consumption on IoT de-
vices. The battery capacity of the Samsung S10 is 3,400mAh (42.8 kJ).
So, the energy cost of InaudibleKey amounts to 0.3𝑒−5 of the total
energy supply. If we assume the smartphone with a targeted lifes-
pan of one day which results in an energy budget of 1.75 kJ per hour.
Then, with only 1% of the battery budget (17.5 J), InaudibleKey is
able to run approximately 175 times per hour, i.e., InaudibleKey
can continuously run every 20 seconds. In the same way, we can
estimate that with 9V battery (500 mAh) and 1% of the battery
budget, InaudibleKey is able to run every 22 minutes on Arduino
Uno board, i.e., it can run about 3 times per hour. These results
demonstrate that InaudibleKey incurs a low system overhead and
is more efficient than public key scheme.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
6.1 Against Vulnerability 1
In Vulnerability 1, Eve can try to reconstruct the keys from 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 di-
rectly using ℓ1 optimization. As discussed above, the key generated
by InaudibleKey has high entropy, which means almost half of the
keys are bit ‘1’s. Fig. 6(a) shows that the initial agreement rate of
Alice and Bob is about 84% when 𝛼 = 0.9. Assume we use 128-bit
key, we have 𝑃 = 128 × 0.84 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(128/(128 × 0.84)) ≈ 19 and
𝑄 = 128 × 50% = 64 according to [32]. Theoretically, the range of
M can be [20,63] because 𝑃 < 𝑀 < 𝑄 . Practically, we can choose
𝑀 ∈ [23, 50] to guarantee security against an adversary and the
availability of the same key.
6.2 Against Vulnerability 2
Eve can perform the following three types of attacks to generate
a key 𝐾𝐸𝑣𝑒 that is close to 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 hoping that she can recover 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏
with the eavesdropped 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 .
Against Eavesdropping Attack. In this attack, Eve can eavesdrop
all the communication traffic in the public channel. Since Eve is
located out of the safe distance (>10 cm), she will obtain a totally
different channel response, as discussed in Sec. 2. From Fig. 11(a),
we can see that the agreement rate of eavesdropping attack is about
20-35%. Therefore, if Eve is out of the safe distance, she cannot
guess the same key due to the different multipath fading channel.
Against Imitating Attack. In this attack, Eve can observe how
Alice and Bob generate keys. Then, after Alice and Bob leave the
site, Eve will ask her partner David to imitate the motion of Alice
and Bob to generate the same key. Previous studies have shown
that simply imitating the user’s shaking or walking motions can-
not generate the same key for accelerometer-based authentication
systems [10, 11, 51]. Similarly, Fig. 11(a) shows that an imitating
attack can achieve a higher agreement rate when 𝛼 increases. But
eventually, it can at most achieve 42% agreement rate. More im-
portantly, Eve does not know which bit is correct because of the
time-varying nature of channels.
Against Predictable Channel Attack. Predictable channel attack
is a simple but effective attack to compromise a key agreement
protocol, especially for RSSI-based approaches [3, 6]. In this attack,
Eve can intentionally block and unblock the Line-of-Sight (LOS)
between Alice and Bob to generate predictable channel measure-
ments. We evaluate this attack by setting up Alice and Bob 100 cm
away with LOS and ask a person to walk between Alice and Bob
intentionally. Then after the key generation, we replace Alice and
Bob with Eve and David and ask the same person to repeat the pro-
cess. Then we compare Eve’s key with Bob’s key to see if Eve can
generate the same key. From Fig. 11(a), we can see that a predictable
channel attack can achieve the highest matching rate among these
three types of attack. But still, it can at most reach 43% matching
rate. Fig. 11(b) plots the CFR of Bob and Eve when the same person
blocks the LOS signal. We can see that although the channel re-
sponses of Bob and Eve are similar in some frequencies, there is still
a large portion of the difference in other frequencies due to time-
varying channels and hardware difference. Particularly, we noticed
that Eve is capable of producing similar channel responses in the
lower frequency range but not the higher frequency range. There
are two reasons. First, the microphone actually works as a low-pass
filter with a 22 kHz cutoff frequency [52]. So in the higher frequency
range, the acoustic signal will be attenuated slightly which results
in more mismatches. Additionally, Zhou et al. [20] found that differ-
ent speakers’ performances are much more diversified at a higher
frequency range. If the attacker leverages more sophisticated hard-
ware, it is possible that they increase their attacking ability. But it
is an open question that requires further investigation.
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Although imitating attack and predictable channel attack can
achieve approximately 43%matching rate, the probability of deduc-
ing the same 128-bit key is extremely low, i.e., 0.43128 = 1.21𝑒−47.
The matching rate of Eve can be further reduced by setting a higher
threshold in quantization or turning down the volume of speaker.
Considering the mathing rate of Eve, a 225-bit key of our system is
equivalent to a 128-bit AES symmetric key, and it takes about 0.3 s
to generate such a key based on the result in Sec. 5.3.
Fig. 11(c) shows the distribution of 𝑃 and 𝑄 in our dataset. We
can see that there is a feasible range to use. In other words, if 𝑀
lies in the feasible range, then InaudibleKey is resilient to the three
types of attacks above. Previous studies also found that if the same
sampling matrix 𝐴 is used repeatedly, both 𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑏 and 𝐾𝐵𝑜𝑏 could be
conditionally accessed [53]. We can easily solve this problem by
updating 𝐴 after each successful key generation. Although 𝐴 needs
to be pre-stored, it is public information instead of a secret that is
only known by Alice and Bob. InaudibleKey does not realise literal
authentication but rely on the user to authenticate the other device.
This is practical because if Eve wants to perform impersonation
attack, she should be close to Alice or Bob. Her suspicious actions
can be easily spotted by Alice or Bob.
7 RELATEDWORK
Proximity-based approaches. The proximity-based approaches
pair two devices based on the observation that two devices in
physical proximity can measure similar physical information. Re-
searchers have proposed many different systems by exploring var-
ious location-sensitive features such as RSSI [7, 8, 54], CSI [4],
audio [55] and illumination [56]. However, these approaches suffer
from a common problem: the distance between two legitimate de-
vices should be very close, e.g., 1.25 cm in Proximate [8] and 5cm
in TDS [4].
Channel reciprocity-based approaches. Physical layer key
generation is a hot research filed over the past decade. Researchers
have studied key agreement for different wireless technologies such
as ZigBee [3],Wi-Fi [4, 5]. Among these approaches, RSSI-based key
generation methods suffer from predictable channel attack and low
bit generation rate. Although CSI-based key generation methods
can improve bit generation rate, most systems rely on customised
hardware to obtain CSI information. Recently, researchers also use
unique body channel to pair two mobile devices [17, 57]. However,
these methods require specialised sensors such as electrode [17]
and Electromyogram sensor [57].
Acoustic signal-based approaches. Recently, the acoustic sig-
nal is also exploited to pair mobile devices [15, 16, 21, 22, 55].
Proximity-based schemes such as [16, 55] are not feasible due to
constraint of social distance. Two recent works [21, 22] are closely
related to our system. FREE [21] used channel tap and the authors
of [22] used sound pressure as channel characteristics. However,
these metrics can only provide a coarse estimation of acoustic chan-
nel. In comparison, we modulate the audio signal using OFDM
technology to obtain fine-grained channel estimation and propose
an optimisation algorithm to improve the performance of reconcili-
ation. This is why we can achieve much higher generation rate.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel key generation system for mobile
devices via inaudible acoustic signal. Extensive evaluation results
show that InaudibleKey outperforms the state-of-the-arts signifi-
cantly. To demonstrate the feasibility, we implement InaudibleKey
on both powerful and resource-limited IoT devices. We also verify
the security of InaudibleKey against malicious attacks. The results
in this paper show that InaudibleKey is a fast, practical and efficient
key generation protocol for mobile devices that can work in various
environments. More importantly, it allows users to pair two mobile
devices without breaking social distance restrictions.
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